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EMMA FARHA
I. Introduction
The Fifth Amendment’s Takings Clause permits the federal government
to condemn property for public use—this is known as eminent domain.1
The federal government can employ the power of eminent domain to take
private or state-owned property, typically through condemnation
proceedings.2 A condemnation proceeding is a type of lawsuit that enables
property to be taken; so, it is a means by which eminent domain is actually
exercised.3 Another doctrine, sovereign immunity, generally bars private
parties from suing states in federal court.4 Because a condemnation
proceeding is a lawsuit, private parties could not sue states to condemn
state-owned land due to sovereign immunity. However, unlike private
entities, the federal government can sue states5 and condemn state-owned
 University of Oklahoma College of Law, JD Candidate 2023. I would like to thank
my family for their support in all my endeavors. I would also like to thank Professor M.
Alexander Pearl and the ONE-J Editorial Board for their help throughout this process.
1. U.S. Const. amend. V.
2. Kohl v. United States, 91 U.S. 367, 371 (1875); Oklahoma ex rel. Phillips v. Guy F.
Atkinson Co., 313 U.S. 508, 534 (1941).
3. See condemnation proceeding. Black’s Law Dictionary (11th ed. 2019) (“A
statutorily authorized lawsuit for the taking of private property for public use without the
owner's consent.); see also condemnation, taking. Black’s Law Dictionary (11th ed. 2019).
4. U.S. Const. amend XI.
5. United States v. Texas, 143 U.S. 621, 646 (1892); Blatchford v. Native Vill. of
Noatak & Circle Vill., 501 U.S. 775 (1991).
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land.6 But what happens when the federal government delegates its power
of eminent domain to a private company that wants to condemn stateowned property?
After PennEast Pipeline Co., LLC v. New Jersey, a private company can
squeeze past state sovereign immunity and initiate condemnation
proceedings against a nonconsenting state.7 In PennEast, the Supreme
Court decided the federal government could delegate its eminent domain
power to PennEast, a natural gas pipeline company, enabling it to condemn
property in which New Jersey had an interest.8 In other words, the Court
held a private company can sue a state in a condemnation proceeding to
take state-owned property.9 The Court reasoned that when the federal
government delegates the power of eminent domain, it delegates all of the
characteristics that accompany that power, including the federal
government’s exception to state sovereign immunity.10 This Note examines
the Supreme Court’s decision in PennEast and how this decision broadens
the power of eminent domain and affects sovereign immunity.
Section II provides an overview of the history of eminent domain and
sovereign immunity. Section III discusses Sabine Pipe Line,11 which is the
only case that directly examines the issue of a private party condemning
state-owned land other than PennEast. Section IV summarizes the
circumstances that gave rise to PennEast, the issue, and procedural history.
Section V describes and analyzes the majority opinion and Justice Barrett’s
dissent. Section VI discusses the Court’s use and debatable interpretation of
history as well as the Court’s rebuttals to counterarguments. Finally,
Section VII briefly concludes this Note with an overview of the issues
discussed.
II. Historical Background
A. Eminent Domain
The Fifth Amendment’s Takings Clause states “nor shall any private
property be taken for public use, without just compensation.”12 In the mid6. Oklahoma ex rel. Phillips, 313 U.S. at 534.
7. 141 S. Ct. 2244, 2252 (2021).
8. Id. at 2252, 2257.
9. Id.
10. Id. at 2257 (“The delegation is categorical.”).
11. Sabine Pipe Line, LLC v. A Permanent Easement of 4.25 +/- Acres of Land in
Orange Cnty., Texas, 327 F.R.D. 131, 135–36 (E.D. Tex. 2017).
12. U.S. Const. amend. V.
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1800s, there was opposition to federal eminent domain power.13 Senators,
congressional committees, and proposed legislation went back and forth on
whether the federal government had this power; and if it did, whether
takings should require state consent.14 These discussions centered around
principles of federalism and proper interpretation of the Constitution.15 In
1845, the Court in Pollard v. Hagan held the United States had no
“constitutional capacity” to exercise eminent domain within a state unless
that power is expressly granted, and it was not.16 Rather, this was a power
the United States exercised only temporarily until a state became a state.17
The Pollard Court went so far to explain that allowing the United States to
exercise eminent domain power over state land would be “placing in their
hands a weapon which might be wielded greatly to the injury of state
sovereignty . . . .”18
But in the 1875 landmark case of Kohl v. United States, the Supreme
Court changed its tune and held the Takings Clause contains an “implied”
assertion that the government may take land.19 Kohl established that the
federal government could employ the inherent power of eminent domain.20
Only 20 years later, in 1895, the Court expanded this newly recognized
power in Luxton v. North River Bridge by holding that the government
could delegate the power of eminent domain to private entities.21 This is
still true today.22 These cases established that the federal government and
delegatees, including private entities, could exercise the power of eminent
domain.
The question of who could utilize this power was seemingly settled, but
whose land was subject to eminent domain still needed to be answered.
Despite the text of the Fifth Amendment plainly stating, “nor shall private
13. William Baude, Rethinking the Federal Eminent Domain Power, 122 Yale L.J.
1738, 1777–78 (2013).
14. Id.
15. Id. at 1751–52.
16. 44 U.S. 212, 223 (1845); Baude, supra note 13, at 1773.
17. Baude, supra note 13, at 1172–74.
18. Pollard, 44 U.S. at 230.
19. Kohl, 91 U.S. at 372–73 (“The fifth amendment contains a provision that private
property shall not be taken for public use without just compensation. What is that but an
implied assertion, that, on making just compensation, it may be taken?”).
20. Id.
21. Luxton v. North River Bridge, 153 U.S. 525, 530 (1894); see Bernard Bell,
Delegation of Eminent Domain Powers to Private Entities: In Re PennEast Pipeline Co.,
Notice & Comment, Yale J. Reg. (Jan. 2022).
22. Abraham Bell, Private Takings, 76 U. Chi. L. Rev. 517, 519 (2009).
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property . . . ,” the Court has since determined both privately owned land
and state-owned land is subject to the exercise of eminent domain.23 In
Kohl, the Court decided property in Cincinnati, Ohio, could be taken to
construct a federal building, which confirmed private property could be
condemned.24 Condemnation of private property has continued since the
Court recognized the power of eminent domain in Kohl.
However, there are relatively few cases where the Court has held stateowned land is also subject to the federal government’s eminent domain
power. In Stockton v. N.Y.R. Co., the Circuit Court for the District of New
Jersey explained that the federal government did not need a state’s consent
to exercise eminent domain.25 The Stockton Court explained that requiring
consent would ignore that the Constitution, and the powers it vests, is the
supreme law of the land.26 Over half a century later, in Oklahoma ex rel.
Phillips v. Guy F. Atkinson Co., the Court explicitly stated, “[t]he fact that
land is owned by a state is no barrier to its condemnation by the United
States.”27
The Court’s opinion in Kohl put eminent domain on the map and marked
the beginning of how courts interpret that power today. After the cases
discussed above, the federal government has the authority to delegate its
power of eminent domain, which includes the ability to condemn private or
state-owned property. And there it is! That is the entirety of how eminent
domain works—right? Of course not. How this delegated power can be
employed is still being debated—PennEast being a prime example.
B. Sovereign Immunity
The Eleventh Amendment states, “[t]he judicial power of the United
States shall not be construed to extend to any suit in law or equity,
commenced or prosecuted against one of the United States by citizens of
another state, or by citizens or subjects of any foreign state.”28 Broadly,
23. Kohl, 91 U.S. at 371; Oklahoma ex rel. Phillips, 313 U.S. at 534.
24. Kohl, 91 U.S. at 371.
25. 32 F. 9, 17 (C.C.D.N.J. 1887).
26. Id. at 18–19 (“[I]t is denied that the land of the state can be taken at all without
voluntary cession, or consent of the state legislature. If this is so, we are brought back to the
dilemma of requiring the consent of the state in almost every case of an interstate line of
communication by railroad . . . . It overlooks the fundamental principle that the constitution,
and all laws made in pursuance thereof, are the supreme law of the land; for, if the consent
of a state is necessary, such state may always, in pursuit of its own interests, refuse its
consent, and thus thwart the plain objects and purposes of the constitution.”).
27. Oklahoma ex rel. Phillips, 313 U.S. at 534 (1941).
28. U.S. Const. amend. XI.
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sovereign immunity means that a government cannot be sued without its
consent.29 Today, sovereign immunity is interpreted as “prohibit[ing] suits
in federal courts against state governments in law, equity, or admiralty, by a
state’s own citizens,” or “by citizens of another state.”30 But like most
constitutional provisions, the scope and meaning of sovereign immunity
was debated at the founding of our country, and this debate continues now.
Implications of the Eleventh Amendment’s text on state sovereignty was
highly debated during its ratification.31 The majority view of this issue
believes that the Eleventh Amendment was originally understood to bar
private suits against nonconsenting states.32 This view looks to leading
Founders—like Hamilton, Madison, and Marshall—who wanted to make
clear that the drafted version of the Constitution preserved states’ immunity
from private suits.33 However, quickly after ratification, the Court handed
down Chisholm v. Georgia, which held that a private citizen of another
state could sue Georgia without its consent.34 Despite Chisolm, the Supreme
Court later explained that the holding in that case was a “shock of surprise”
and contrary to the original understanding of the Constitution.35 Modern
caselaw accepts that the Eleventh Amendment was meant to protect states’
sovereign immunity.36
The minority view on this issue questions whether this was the intent of
the Eleventh Amendment.37 Professor Susan Randall argues that the history
does not support the conclusion that the Constitution was meant to protect
states’ sovereign immunity.38 Specifically, statements often cited as support
for this position from Founders like Hamilton, Madison, and Marshall are
29. Sovereign immunity. Black’s Law Dictionary (11th ed. 2019) (“A government's
immunity from being sued in its own courts without its consent.”).
30. Erwin Chemerinsky, Constitutional Law Principles and Policies §2.10, 195 (6th ed.
2019).
31. Id. at §2.10.3.
32. Gregory C. Sisk, A Primer on the Doctrine of Federal Sovereign Immunity, 58 Okla.
L. Rev. 439, 443 (2005); Ann K. Wooster, Annotation, Immunity of State from Civil Suits
Under Eleventh Amendment—Supreme Court Cases, 187 A.L.R. Fed. 175, §2(a) (2003);
Alden v. Maine, 527 U.S. 706, 717 (1999).
33. Wooster, supra note 32; Sisk supra note 29, at 443–44.
34. 2 U.S. 419, 420 (1793).
35. Wooster, supra note 32; Hans v. Louisiana, 134 U.S. 1, 11–12 (1890); Seminole
Tribe of Florida. v. Florida, 517 U.S. 44, 55 (1996).
36. Sisk, supra note 32, at 443; Alden, 527 U.S. at 717; Welch v. Texas Dep't of
Highways & Pub. Transp., 483 U.S. 468, 483 (1987).
37. Sisk, supra note 29, at 444.
38. Susan Randall, Sovereign Immunity and the Uses of History, 81 Neb. L. Rev. 1, 10–
11 (2002).
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contradicted by the Founders’ own later statements as well as
interpretations made by their contemporaries.39 Further, Randall explains
that discussions during ratification do not clearly support the Court’s
current view of history; rather, debates in state conventions tend to show
that states understood they did not have complete sovereign immunity in
the courts.40 Notably, in cases involving the issue of state sovereign
immunity, dissenters like Justice Stevens41 and Justice Souter42 similarly
view the history as not being on the majority view’s side.43
The different interpretations of what the predominant view was during
the ratification of the Eleventh Amendment informs the debate about the
scope of sovereign immunity. Sovereign immunity does not bar all suits
against a state; several exceptions to state sovereign immunity exist. A state
can be sued by another state or the federal government.44 Moreover,
Congress can abrogate state immunity in limited circumstances. Generally,
Congress can limit immunity by enforcing rights under the Fourteenth
Amendment,45 but cannot abrogate immunity pursuant to its Article I
powers.46 A state can also consent to being sued or waive its immunity from
suits.47
A significant point of divergence in PennEast between the majority’s
opinion and Justice Barrett’s dissent is whether states implicitly waived
their sovereign immunity to these specific suits involving eminent domain
in the plan of the Convention.48 Like most constitutional provisions, there
are typically several layers to different interpretations. There are many
ways to interpret the text of the Constitution, many ways to interpret the

39. Id. at 13.
40. Id. at 9, 54–55.
41. Kimel v. Florida Bd. of Regents, 528 U.S. 62, 92 (2000) (Stevens, J., dissenting in
part, concurring in part); Seminole Tribe of Florida, 517 U.S. at 76 (Stevens, J., dissenting).
42. Seminole Tribe of Florida, 517 U.S. at 100 (Souter, J., dissenting); Alden, 527 U.S.
at 760 (Souter, J., dissenting).
43. Randall, supra note 38, at 10; Sisk supra note 30, at 444.
44. Blatchford, 501 U.S. at 782 (“We have hitherto found a surrender of immunity
against particular litigants in only two contexts: suits by sister States, . . . and suits by
the United States.”).
45. Fitzpatrick v. Bitzer, 427 U.S. 445 (1976).
46. Seminole Tribe of Florida, 517 U.S. at 73.
47. Clark v. Barnard, 108 U.S. 436, 448 (1883) (“The immunity from suit belonging to
a state, . . . is a personal privilege which it may waive at pleasure.”); Wisconsin Dep't of
Corr. v. Schacht, 524 U.S. 381, 382 (1998).
48. PennEast, 141 S. Ct. at 2257; id. at 2267 (Barrett, J., dissenting).
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cases that interpreted the Constitution, and so on. This Note explains the
Court’s differing opinions on this issue in Section V.
III. Current Caselaw
Two previous judicial opinions discuss the interplay between state
sovereign immunity and eminent domain exercised by a private party. The
first is the United States District Court for the Eastern District of Texas’s
decision in Sabine Pipe Line. The second is the Third Circuit’s decision
regarding the case at issue,49 which this Note discusses in the procedural
history portion of Section V. Both of these decisions held that sovereign
immunity bars condemnation of state-owned land because parties cannot
sue a state in federal court.
At the district level, courts have determined that a private company
cannot be sued in federal court to condemn state-owned land. In Sabine
Pipe Line, the natural gas company had a prior right-of-way agreement
(“ROA”) over three parcels of land.50 But when the land was sold, the new
owner of one of the parcels, the Texas Parks and Wildlife Department
(“TPWD”), refused to renew the ROA.51 The natural gas company filed a
complaint for condemnation seeking to exercise eminent domain granted to
it by the Natural Gas Act (“NGA”),52 and TPWD filed a motion to dismiss
asserting the Eleventh Amendment barred the action.53
The Sabine Pipe Line court explained the power of eminent domain is
distinct from the federal government’s ability to sue nonconsenting states. 54
Eminent domain powers may be delegated because the federal government
has the inherent power to do so.55 However, the federal government does
not have the inherent power to sue nonconsenting states; rather, the federal
government “enjoys a special exemption from the Eleventh Amendment.” 56
States granted permission to be sued by the federal government when they
ratified the Constitution.57 For these reasons, the court held the natural gas
49. In re PennEast Pipeline Co., LLC, 938 F.3d 96 (3d Cir. 2019), as amended (Sept.
11, 2019), as amended (Sept. 19, 2019), rev'd and remanded sub nom. PennEast Pipeline
Co., LLC, 141 S. Ct. 2244, (2021).
50. Sabine Pipe Line, 327 F.R.D. at 135.
51. Id. at 135–36.
52. 15 U.S.C.A. §§ 717–717w (West).
53. 327 F.R.D. at 135–36.
54. Id. at 140–41.
55. Id. at 139–40.
56. Id. at 140.
57. Id.
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company did not acquire the right to sue TPWD simply because it had been
delegated the federal government’s eminent domain power.58
IV. Statement of the Case
A. Natural Gas Act
The NGA59 delegates the right to exercise eminent domain to private
companies.60 Under § 717f(c)(1)(A), a company that would like to condemn
property must apply for a certificate of public convenience and necessity
from the Federal Energy Regulatory Commission (“FERC”).61 The
company must also demonstrate that it could not negotiate a deal with the
property owner and that the value of the property exceeds $3,000.62 If and
when the FERC issues the certificate, the holder “may exercise eminent
domain against any holdouts in acquiring property rights necessary to
complete the pipeline.”63 This means certificate holders can initiate eminent
domain proceedings (a condemnation proceeding) in federal court. This is
the process PennEast used.64
B. Facts
PennEast is a natural gas company that applied to the FERC for a
certificate of public convenience and necessity to build a 116-mile pipeline
from Pennsylvania to New Jersey.65 In January 2018, the FERC granted
PennEast the certificate to construct the pipeline.66 PennEast wanted to
exercise federal eminent domain power under § 717f of the NGA to obtain
rights-of-way along the pipeline.67 PennEast filed complaints in the United
States District Court for the District of New Jersey seeking to condemn
several parcels of land in which New Jersey claimed to have a possessory
interest in as well as conservation easements, and other parcels in which the

58.
59.
60.
61.
2021).
62.
63.
64.
65.
66.
67.

Id. at 141.
§§ 717–717w.
Id. at § 717f (h).
Id.; Env't Def. Fund v. Fed. Energy Regul. Comm'n, 2 F.4th 953, 961 (D.C. Cir.
§ 717f(h).
Id.
PennEast, 141 S. Ct. at 2253.
Id.
Id.
Id.
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New Jersey Conservation Foundation had an interest.68 New Jersey moved
to dismiss PennEast’s complaints on sovereign immunity grounds.69
C. Procedural History and Issue
The district court addressed New Jersey’s objections regarding sovereign
immunity and whether the court had jurisdiction to hear the case.70 The
district court found that because PennEast held a certificate of compliance
from the FERC it stood “in the shoes of the sovereign,” which made the
Eleventh Amendment inapplicable.71 The district court granted PennEast’s
application for orders of condemnation so it could begin construction.72
The Third Circuit vacated the district court’s orders of condemnation and
remanded the case for dismissal of the claims against New Jersey.73 The
Third Circuit found that a private party does not acquire the government’s
exemption from the Eleventh Amendment simply because it was delegated
the government’s power of eminent domain.74 The court reasoned that the
power of eminent domain is separate from the power to hale states to
federal court.75 The Third Circuit explained its view that the federal
government can exercise eminent domain over states not because it
inherently has the right to do so but because it “enjoys a special
exemption.”76
The court held it was unlikely this special exemption could be delegated
for three reasons.77 First, there was no caselaw to support the conclusion
that the government’s exemption from the Eleventh Amendment could be
delegated.78 The court noted that the Supreme Court expressed doubt that
the exemption could be delegated in Blatchford v. Native Village of
Noatak.79 In Blatchford, a Native American tribe sued a state official
68. Id.
69. Id.
70. In re Penneast Pipeline Co., LLC, No. CV 18-1585, 2018 WL 6584893, at 8.
(D.N.J. Dec. 14, 2018), vacated and remanded sub nom. In re PennEast Pipeline Co., LLC,
938 F.3d 96 (3d Cir. 2019)
71. Id. at 12.
72. Id. at 25–26.
73. In re PennEast Pipeline Co., LLC, 938 F.3d at 99.
74. Id. at 104.
75. Id. at 100.
76. Id. at 104.
77. Id. at 100.
78. Id. at 105.
79. Id. at 105 (citing Blatchford v. Native Vill. of Noatak & Circle Vill., 501 U.S. 775,
777 (1991)).
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seeking payment they believed was owed to them under a state revenuesharing statute.80 The tribe argued the suit was proper because Congress had
delegated it the federal government’s exemption from sovereign
immunity.81 Justice Scalia, writing for the majority, wrote, “we doubt . . .
that [the] sovereign immunity exemption can be delegated.”82 The
Blatchford Court explained that “[t]he consent, ‘inherent in the convention,’
to suit by the United States—at the instance and under the control of
responsible federal officers—is not consent to suit by anyone whom the
United States might select . . . .”83 Justice Scalia further characterized this
theory of delegation as “a creature of [its] own invention.”84 The Third
Circuit concluded that not only was there “no authority for PennEast’s
delegation theory of sovereign immunity,” but caselaw actually suggested
the government cannot delegate its exemption from sovereign immunity.85
Second, there is a significant difference between the United States
bringing a suit against a state and a suit brought by a private entity. 86 The
court highlighted that unlike for-profit, private parties, the federal
government has constitutional duties as well as political responsibilities it
must consider when acting.87 Given that these considerations are “not
insignificant,” the court felt not being able to delegate an exception to
sovereign immunity made sense.88
Third, allowing delegation of this exemption would “undermine” limits
on abrogating state immunity.89 The court explained the Supreme Court has
outlined exacting requirements for Congress to be able to abrogate state
immunity.90 Congressional action must be “unmistakably clear.”91 This is a
“high bar” that must be met without “nontextual arguments,”92 and
reference to legislative history should be unnecessary.93 Further, Congress
cannot abrogate state sovereignty pursuant to its Commerce Clause
80.
81.
82.
83.
84.
85.
86.
87.
88.
89.
90.
91.
92.
93.

Blatchford, 501 U.S. at 775.
Id. at 785.
Id.
Id.
Id. at 786.
In re PennEast Pipeline Co., LLC, 938 F.3d at 106–07.
Id. at 107.
Id.
Id.
Id. at 105.
Id. at 107–08.
Id. at 107 (quoting Dellmuth v. Muth, 491 U.S. 223, 227 (1989)).
Id. at 107.
Dellmuth, 491 U.S. at 230.
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powers.94 These are exacting requirements because abrogating “sovereign
immunity upsets the fundamental constitutional balance between the
Federal Government and the States, placing a considerable strain on the
principles of federalism that inform Eleventh Amendment doctrine.”95 With
this in mind, the Third Circuit concluded that accepting PennEast’s
argument that the federal government’s exemption from sovereign
immunity can be delegated would allow Congress to skirt the Eleventh
Amendment through legislation—making the Eleventh Amendment’s
protections meaningless.96
The Third Circuit explained that even if the government’s exemption
could be delegated, the NGA would not be a valid congressional abrogation
of sovereign immunity because it is not sufficiently clear.97 The court found
the NGA does not indicate that it is intended to delegate the government’s
exception to the Eleventh Amendment; it does not mention the Eleventh
Amendment or sovereign immunity at all.98 Because the NGA’s text has no
indication it meant to abrogate state sovereign immunity, the Third Circuit
refused to interpret it to allow delegation of the federal government’s
exemption from state sovereign immunity.99 This is especially so because
that interpretation would “upend a fundamental aspect of our constitutional
design.”100 The court therefore vacated the district court's order allowing
PennEast to condemn New Jersey’s property interests.101
The Supreme Court granted certiorari to decide whether the NGA
authorizes certificate holders to condemn land in which a state claims an
interest.102
V. Decision
A. Majority Opinion
A 5-4 majority of the Court found PennEast could initiate condemnation
proceedings against state property pursuant to the NGA’s grant of eminent
94.
at 59.
95.
227).
96.
97.
98.
99.
100.
101.
102.

In re PennEast Pipeline Co., LLC, 938 F.3d at 108; Seminole Tribe of Fla., 517 U.S.
In re PennEast Pipeline Co., LLC, 938 F.3d at 107 (quoting Dellmuth, 491 U.S. at
Id. at 109 n.15.
Id. at 105, 108.
Id. at 110.
Id. at 112.
Id.
Id. at 113.
PennEast, 141 S. Ct. at 2254.
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domain power.103 The Court reached its conclusion by establishing
premises that, if taken as true, allow the inference to be made that
PennEast’s exercise of eminent domain includes the right to sue a state in a
condemnation proceeding. Chief Justice Roberts began the majority opinion
by discussing the government’s eminent domain power and explaining that
it includes the authority to condemn private and state-owned land.104 Next,
the Court established that the power to condemn private and state-owned
land can be delegated to private entities and that the NGA does just that.105
The Court then explained that sovereign immunity does not bar PennEast
from exercising eminent domain because states consented to such suits
when they ratified the Constitution.106
1. History of the Power of Eminent Domain
The majority opinion found that the Fifth Amendment recognized the
power of eminent domain and then looked to caselaw to establish that this
power includes the right to take land within the federal government’s
jurisdiction, private property, and state-owned property.107 The Court
begins by positing that the history of eminent domain dates back to Biblical
times and was exercised in England and the Colonies.108 According to the
majority’s view, this age-old power was recognized in the Fifth
Amendment’s Takings Clause.109 The Court noted that this power was
affirmed soon after ratification in a congressional act from 1809, which
authorized a turnpike road to be built in the District of Columbia.110 This
act supports the argument that the federal government exercised eminent
domain over property within its exclusive federal jurisdiction.111
Turning to caselaw, the Court noted Kohl v. United States affirmed the
existence of the inherent power of eminent domain and held this power
could be exercised over private property.112 The majority then explained
this power is not exclusive to private property.113 The Court cites Oklahoma
ex rel. Phillips v. Guy F. Atkinson Co., which states “[t]he fact that land is
103.
104.
105.
106.
107.
108.
109.
110.
111.
112.
113.

Id. at 2252.
Id. at 2254.
Id. at 2257.
Id. at 2259.
Id. at 2254–55.
Id. at 2255.
Id.
Id.
Id.
Id.
Id.
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owned by a state is no barrier to its condemnation by the United States.”114
The Court concluded that not only can eminent domain be exercised over
private land, but state-owned land as well.115
2. Delegation of the Power of Eminent Domain to Private Parties
The next section of the opinion seeks to establish that the power of
eminent domain, which can be exercised over private and state-owned land,
can be delegated to private parties.116 The Court explains that delegating
this power to private parties was “commonplace before and after the
founding of the Colonies and then the State to authorize private
condemnation of land for a variety of public works.”117 In Stockton v.
N.Y.R. Co., Justice Bradley held a New York corporation could take New
Jersey’s land to build a bridge.118 In Cherokee Nation v. Southern Kansas
Ry. Co., the Court held a congressional act could authorize a railroad
company to condemn Cherokee-owned land.119 The Cherokee Nation Court
reasoned it had already been established that eminent domain could be
exercised over state land, so it follows that it can also be exercised “in a
Territory occupied by an Indian nation or tribe.”120 In reliance on this
caselaw, Chief Justice Roberts concluded, “eminent domain power may be
exercised—whether by the Government or its delegatees—within state
boundaries, including against state property.”121 In other words, a private
entity is delegated all the government’s power of eminent domain, not
authority to exercise eminent domain over this and not that.122
The Court further explained § 717f(h) was specifically passed to deal
with the issue of whether eminent domain may be used by private
companies.123 States were impeding pipelines by not allowing companies to
use their eminent domain procedures, which effectively halts the
condemnation.124 Section 717f resolved this by affirming that when the
power of eminent domain is delegated to a company it includes the right to

114.
115.
116.
117.
118.
119.
120.
121.
122.
123.
124.

Id. (quoting State of Oklahoma ex rel. Phillips, 313 U.S. at 534).
Id. at 2254.
Id. at 2255.
Id.
32 F. at. 17, 21.
135 U.S. 641 (1890).
Id. at 656–57; PennEast, 141 S. Ct. at 2256.
PennEast, 141 S. Ct. at 2257.
Id. (“The delegation is categorical.”).
Id.
Id.

Published by University of Oklahoma College of Law Digital Commons, 2022

160

Oil and Gas, Natural Resources, and Energy Journal

[Vol. 8

exercise it over state-owned land, just as the federal government does.125
Therefore, PennEast has the power to condemn state-owned land.126
3. States Consented to Eminent Domain Suits in the Plan of the
Convention
The majority opinion then addressed the issue of whether sovereign
immunity bars private companies from initiating condemnation proceedings
against states.127 Meaning, the Court discussed whether a private entity was
barred by sovereign immunity from suing a state in court to initiate the
process of condemning state-owned land; this is also known as the power to
condemn. The Court held sovereign immunity does not bar condemnation
proceedings because the power of eminent domain cannot be divorced from
the power to condemn.128
The Court begins by agreeing with Justice Barrett’s dissent that
immunity cannot be abrogated through Congress’s use of its commerce
power.129 However, the Court explained a state’s immunity can be
abrogated in another way—states can be “sued if they have consented to the
suit in the plan of the Convention.”130 The majority argues that states
implicitly consented to suits by the federal government with regard to
eminent domain because it was “contemplated that States’ eminent domain
power would yield to” the federal government’s.131 Because of the concept
of federal supremacy, when states consented “in the plan of the Convention
to the exercise of federal eminent domain power,” they waived their
sovereign immunity to the federal government exercising eminent
domain.132 As noted above, the federal government delegates the entire
power of eminent domain, which means that power carries with it the
implicit consent to these suits. Accordingly, when PennEast exercises that
delegated power, it includes states’ implicit consent. A condemnation suit
against New Jersey therefore “falls comfortably within the class of suits to
which States consented under the plan of the Convention.”133 PennEast may

125. Id. (“By its terms, §717f(h) delegates to certificate holders the power to condemn
any necessary rights-of-way, including land in which a State holds an interest.)
126. Id.
127. Id. at 2257–58.
128. Id. at 2260, 2263.
129. Id. at 2259.
130. Id. at 2259; Alden v. Maine, 527 U.S. 706, 755, (1999).
131. PennEast, at 2259.
132. Id.
133. Id.
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exercise eminent domain because it is outside the protection of New
Jersey’s sovereign immunity.
The majority then addressed New Jersey and the dissent’s argument that
there is no evidence of these kind of suits at the time of the founding so
states could not have understood ratifying the Constitution as consenting to
being sued by a private party, like the suit at hand.134 The Court explained
that a lack of private suits against states does not cast doubt on the ability to
exercise eminent domain within states.135 Kohl resolved the issue by
concluding the government can exercise eminent domain over state-owned
land and that this was “known and appropriate” at the founding.136
Further, the Court believes New Jersey and the dissent frame the issue
incorrectly.137 It is not about a private entity’s ability to sue a state, but
whether the exercise of eminent domain includes the ability to sue the state,
which the Court answers in the affirmative.138 The power of eminent
domain is “inextricably intertwined with the ability to condemn.”139 The
power of eminent domain cannot be separated from the power to condemn
because without the ability to condemn (sue the state for the land), the only
way to exercise eminent domain is to take the land and force the state to sue
for compensation.140 The Court explained that eminent domain necessarily
has to include the power to condemn, otherwise delegatees must take land
from a state without first going to court, which is antithetical to principles
of state sovereignty.141
Lastly, the majority briefly addressed New Jersey’s argument, and the
Third Circuit’s position, that the NGA does not authorize these suits
because it lacks the requisite clarity to do so. The Court explained that this
again mischaracterizes the issue.142 It is not whether the federal government
can delegate its exception to sovereign immunity to sue a state, but whether
the government can delegate its eminent domain powers to a private
entity.143 New Jersey agreed § 717f(h) delegates the power to condemn
property with “sufficient clarity,” but argued the statute did not clearly
134.
135.
136.
137.
138.
139.
140.
141.
142.
143.

Id. at 2260.
Id. at 2261.
Id. (quoting Kohl, 91 U.S. at 372).
Id. at 2260.
Id.
Id.
Id.
Id
Id. at 2662.
Id.
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delegate the power to condemn state property.144 The Court explained that
the power of eminent domain is delegated “in its entirety” and states
consented to this during the ratification of the Constitution.145 Because the
states consented to the entire power of eminent domain, which includes the
power to condemn, the NGA’s delegation of eminent domain power creates
no sovereign immunity issues.146
The Court reversed the Third Circuit’s decision and concluded that the
NGA “fits well within [the] tradition” of the federal government delegating
to private corporations the ability to take or condemn against private or
state-owned land.147 Because PennEast had the appropriate FERC
certificate, it was permitted to condemn all necessary rights-of-ways
regardless of whether it is privately owned or state-owned.148
B. Justice Barrett’s Dissent
Joined by Justice Thomas, Justice Kagan, and Justice Gorsuch, Justice
Barrett’s dissenting opinion reasoned that precedent should have easily
decided this case, but she continued her opinion beyond this issue to
highlight several problems with the majority’s reasoning.149 Justice Barrett
found the majority’s conclusion, which holds that states “surrendered their
immunity to private condemnation suits in the ‘plan of the Convention,’”150
is not supported by the structure of the Constitution, caselaw, or history.151
Because there was no implicit waiver of sovereign immunity to these kinds
of suits, the majority’s inquiry into the scope of the eminent domain power
frames the issue in this case incorrectly.152 The relevant question is whether
the NGA can enable a private party to sue a nonconsenting state.153 Justice
Barrett found the NGA is not an appropriate way to abrogate states’
sovereign immunity.154 Finally, Justice Barrett addressed the majority’s
argument that the power of eminent domain must necessarily include the
ability to sue nonconsenting states.155
144.
145.
146.
147.
148.
149.
150.
151.
152.
153.
154.
155.

Id. at 2263.
Id.
Id.
Id.
Id.
PennEast, 141 S. Ct. at 2265 (Barrett, J., dissenting).
Id. at 2266 (quoting the majority at 2259).
Id.
Id. at 2267.
Id.
Id.
Id. at 2269
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In order to conclude that states have relinquished their sovereign
immunity, there must be compelling evidence that the surrender was
inherent in the constitutional design.156 There are two reasons Justice
Barrett believes our constitutional structure does not permit private parties
to condemn state-owned property. First, unlike the majority, Justice Barrett
interprets the power of eminent domain as not being a “stand-alone”
power.157 Meaning, the Takings Clause is a limitation on “Government
power, not a grant of it,” so any exercise of eminent domain is through
other constitutional provisions.158 For example, when Congress permits
condemnation through the NGA, Congress is choosing “a means by which
to carry out” its Commerce Clause Power.159
Second, it is an incorrect assumption that the federal government can
exercise eminent domain over state-owned land because they ratified the
Constitution.160 The federal government can exercise eminent domain over
state land not because states specifically consented to it, but because states
have no immunity against any suits by the federal government, Oklahoma
ex rel. Phillips is an example of this.161 In other words, there is no implicit
consent needed for the federal government to condemn state-owned land.
Because eminent domain is exercised through other constitutional
provisions and states did not implicitly waive their immunity to private
suits, the pertinent question for Justice Barrett is whether the NGA
abrogated New Jersey’s sovereign immunity so that PennEast was not
barred from condemning state-owned land.162 Congress passed the NGA
pursuant to its Article I Commerce Clause power.163 The Supreme Court
has consistently held Congress cannot abrogate states’ sovereign immunity
pursuant to its Article I powers.164 Because Congress passed the NGA
pursuant to its Commerce Clause power and is barred from abrogating
states’ sovereign immunity in this manner, § 717f(h) cannot authorize these

156. Id. at 2266 (citing Blatchford, 501 U.S at 781).
157. Compare PennEast, 141 S. Ct. at 2266 (Barrett, J., dissenting) with PennEast, 141
S. Ct. at 2255 (majority opinion stating, “[t]he Takings Clause of the Fifth Amendment []
recognized the existence of such power.”).
158. PennEast, 141 S. Ct. at 2267, n. 2.
159. Id. at 2267.
160. Id.
161. Id.; West Virginia v. United States, 479 U.S. 305, 311 (1987).
162. PennEast, 141 S. Ct. at 2267.
163. Id.
164. Id. at 2265–66; Allen v. Cooper, 140 S. Ct. 994, at 1002 (2020); Seminole, 517 U.S.
at 72.
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types of suits.165 PennEast should not have been permitted to sue New
Jersey in a condemnation proceeding.166 Justice Barrett believes the inquiry
should have stopped there.167
But even with that issue aside, the caselaw and history the majority relies
on falls far short of compelling.168 There is not a “single decision involving
a private condemnation suit against a State, let alone any decision holding
that the States lack immunity from such suits.”169 Kohl was a suit by the
United States, Oklahoma ex rel. Phillips was a suit by the state of
Oklahoma against a company in contract with the federal government,
Luxton was a private company suing for privately owned land, and Stockton
was a suit brought by the state of New Jersey.170 Additionally, it was
unsettled for 75 years after the founding “whether the federal government
could even exercise eminent domain over private land” in a state.171
Oklahoma ex rel. Phillips, which the majority relies on heavily, was not
handed down until 1941.172 Justice Barrett found the majority downplays
“the historical absence of private condemnation suits”173 and failed to
demonstrate states waived their immunity to private condemnation suits in
the plan of the Convention.174 The majority’s conclusion is unsupported by
both history and caselaw.175
Finally, Justice Barrett found the majority’s argument that eminent
domain is inextricably linked with the ability to condemn to be
unpersuasive.176 The majority argues that if private parties cannot initiate
condemnation proceedings against nonconsenting states there is no way to
actually use that delegated power.177 Justice Barrett explains that the power
of eminent domain does not become worthless because one method of
condemnation is taken off the table.178 Eminent domain is the federal
government’s power, not PennEast’s, and the United States can still take
165.
166.
167.
168.
169.
170.
171.
172.
173.
174.
175.
176.
177.
178.

PennEast, 141 S. Ct. at 2267.
Id. at 2265.
Id. at 2267.
Id. at 2268.
Id.
Id.
Id.
Id.
Id.
Id. at 2269.
Id. at 2268.
Id. at 2269.
Id. at 2269; id. at 2260 (majority opinion).
Id. at 2269.
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New Jersey’s property if it wants.179 Simply because sovereign immunity
makes Congress’s ability to condemn land more difficult does not mean
sovereign immunity should be set aside—it was designed that way on
purpose.180
Justice Barrett diverges from the majority due to her interpretation of
eminent domain’s place within our constitutional structure, and because she
found the precedent and history the majority offered to be insufficient. 181 In
Justice Barrett’s view, the Court did not muster the “compelling evidence”
required to demonstrate states surrendered their immunity to private suits in
the plan of the Convention.182
VI. Analysis
This decision’s impact is not insignificant. PennEast not only narrows
states’ sovereign immunity but also broadens the already wide latitude
private companies have to condemn property. This decision holds that a
private entity can condemn state-owned land if it is employing the federal
government’s eminent domain power. And while this conclusion makes
sense moving from one premise to the next, the Court does not persuasively
address counterarguments and did not explain why it chose one historical
interpretation over another.
As discussed in Section II of this Note, the original understanding of
eminent domain and state sovereign immunity was highly debated at the
ratification of the Constitution and Bill of Rights. The role of the Court
often requires it to choose which version of history decides the issue at
hand and is faithful to the meaning of the Constitution.183 But deciding
which historical facts are the most persuasive, or even deciding which are
“correct,” is not the issue here. Rather, the problem arises when the Court
does not explain why its interpretation of the historical facts is more
persuasive than another. Understandably, we cannot expect the justices of
the Court to be historians, that is not their job. But when the understanding
of a topic at the time of ratification weighs heavily on the outcome of a
case, the history should not be glanced over. It is reasonable to expect this
transparency from the Court.
179. Id.
180. Id. at 2270.
181. Id. at 2266, 2269–70.
182. Id. at 2269.
183. Depending on interpretation methods used by the Court the question about history
may be less significant.
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Like Justice Barrett’s dissent and the Third Circuit’s opinion point out,
there is no favorable caselaw to support the majority’s conclusion that a
private entity can sue a state to condemn state-owned land.184 The only case
directly on point with the issues of this case is Sabine Pipe Line, and the
district court deciding this case held sovereign immunity barred the natural
gas company from suing for state-owned property.185 While a lack of
caselaw does not prove that private entities cannot condemn state-owned
land, it importantly highlights that the proposition that they can do so has
no support in precedent.
Further, there is a lack of historical evidence to support the argument that
states could have understood ratification of the Constitution and Bill of
Rights as renouncing their right to assert any sovereign immunity defense
to condemnation suits. The Court believes that, at the time of its
ratification, the Fifth Amendment recognized the power of eminent
domain.186 By consenting via ratification, the Court believes states
consented to condemnation proceedings initiated by the federal government
as well as by any private delegatees.187 The majority’s opinion is reasonable
if it is read in a vacuum. But the Court failed to address history that is
unfavorable to its conclusion and treated the history it cited as dispositive.
Experts of the history of eminent domain continue to debate whether the
federal government believed that the power of eminent domain existed in
the late 18th-century.188 There is evidence that in the early 19th century the
federal government relied on state cooperation to build things like
lighthouses and roads.189 Rather than the federal government taking state
land, states would pass legislation allowing the federal government to
purchase the land for these various projects.190 In the mid-19th century, the
Supreme Court in Pollard explained that the power of eminent domain was
not expressly granted in the Constitution.191 Further, the Pollard Court
stated it is “repugnant to the Constitution” to hold that the United States can
exercise this sovereign power over state land after that property was ceded
to the state.192 But in 1875, Kohl overturned Pollard and held that the
184.
185.
186.
187.
188.
189.
190.
191.
192.

PennEast, 141 S. Ct. at 2268; In re PennEast Pipeline Co., LLC, 938 F.3d at 105.
327 F.R.D. at 141.
PennEast, 141 S. Ct. at 2255.
Id. at 2259.
See Baude, supra note 13, at 1766.
Baude, supra note 13, at 1762.
Id.
Pollard, 44 U.S. at 223; Baude, supra note 13, at 1773.
Pollard, 44 U.S. at 225.
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federal power of eminent domain existed.193 It was not until 1941 that the
Court held state ownership of land is not a barrier to the federal exercise of
eminent domain.194
It is not clear that the power of eminent domain had been practiced
“since its inception.”195 If it is questionable whether states could have
understood ratification as consenting to suits by the government, then it is
difficult to argue that states could have also understood they were
consenting to condemnation suits by private parties. The existence of a
federal eminent domain power was questioned until 1875 and there are no
cases from that period where a private party was delegated the power of
eminent domain and then condemned state-owned land.
The majority addressed this particular objection by citing the Kohl
opinion where the Court held the exercise of the eminent domain power
was “’known and appropriate’ at the time of the founding” and the “nonuse[] of a power does not disprove its existence.”196 This response misses
the point. The objection is not only about the non-use of the power, but also
the fact that until Kohl, it was questioned whether a federal eminent domain
power existed at all. Regardless of whether Kohl resolves that issue, it is
problematic that the majority skips over a large portion of the history of
eminent domain in our country and then claims the history and caselaw it
cites leads to the Court’s conclusion.
Even if eminent domain has been exercised since the federal
government’s inception and states consented to it, why must it follow that
states consented to eminent domain used by private delegatees? The
majority viewpoint of the Eleventh Amendment’s meaning at the time of its
ratification is that it was originally understood to bar private suits against
nonconsenting states.197 Similar to the history of eminent domain, the Court
does not discuss this issue.
But a more obvious incongruence in the majority’s opinion is its
argument that the delegated power of eminent domain would be toothless if
193. Kohl, 91 U.S. at 372–73.
194. Oklahoma ex rel. Phillips, 313 U.S. at 534; PennEast, 141 S. Ct. at 2268 (Barrett, J.,
dissent).
195. See PennEast, 141 S. Ct. at 2275 (“Since its inception, the Federal Government has
wielded the power of eminent domain . . . .”).
196. Id. at 2262; Kohl, 91 U.S. at 372.
197. Gregory C. Sisk, A Primer on the Doctrine of Federal Sovereign Immunity, 58 Okla.
L. Rev. 439, 443 (2005); Ann K. Wooster, Annotation, Immunity of State from Civil Suits
Under Eleventh Amendment—Supreme Court Cases, 187 A.L.R. Fed. 175, §2(a) (2003);
Alden v. Maine, 527 U.S. 706, 717 (1999).
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it did not have a mechanism (condemnation) to use it.198 The majority even
goes as far to say that if private entities could not initiate condemnation
proceedings, the only option to employ the delegated power of eminent
domain would be to have the federal government, rather than the private
entity, take the property now and pay later.199 But the majority believes this
does not “vindicate principles underlying state sovereign immunity.”200
That is inconsistent with the Court’s reasoning. If we buy into the
majority’s reasoning that states consented to federal supremacy and
eminent domain at the Convention, then the federal government exercising
this power in these circumstances would not offend the “fundamental
postulates implicit in the constitutional design,” which includes principles
of federalism. It is odd that the Court maintains that the federal government
exercising eminent domain, which it believes has already been consented
to, would offend federalism, but a private delegatee suing a state would not.
History is rarely dispositive of constitutional issues, even when the Court
acts as if it is. Interpretations of what happened in our history are almost
always debatable and experts often have differing opinions as to what “the”
understanding was. Given how important the historical understanding of
what eminent domain meant at the time of our founding is to the Court’s
opinion, the Court should have done more to explain why its historical take
is the better one.
VII. Conclusion
Even though PennEast is not a decision that makes attorneys grasp their
pearls in shock and run to write a scathing op-ed, it is still significant.
PennEast allows private entities to condemn state-owned land. The Court
reached its decision by arguing that this has been the case since ratification
of the Constitution and Bill of Rights. The majority concluded states
surrendered immunity from the federal government’s power of eminent
domain in the plan of the Convention.201 At the time, it was understood that
the power of eminent domain could be delegated to private entities; so,
when states ratified the Constitution and Bill of Rights, they consented to
eminent domain exercised by the federal government or a delegatee.202
States therefore do not have immunity to invoke and PennEast may
198.
199.
200.
201.
202.

PennEast, 141 S. Ct. at 2260.
Id.
Id.
Id. at 2266 (Justice Barrett’s summary of the majority’s conclusions).
Id.
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condemn state-owned land.203 Even though the history the Court uses in its
argument is not conclusive, this decision ultimately concludes state
sovereign immunity is not as robust as states might prefer.

203. Id.
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